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ABSTRACT
The public policy benefits that parties-deliver are
allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to
majority rule. Majority—ru1e decision making, however, does not
lead to consistent policy choices; it is "unstable." In this
paper, we argue that institutions -— and thereby policy
coalitions -- can be stabilized by extra-legislative
organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S.
House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued
membership is support on the floor of Caucus decisions for a
variety of key structural matters. _Because_membership in the
majority party’s caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the
posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence
the policy decisions made in the House. We examine the rules of
the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain
the essential elements of an effective, extralegisaltive bonding
mechanism.
l. INTRODUCTION
Why do political parties exist and persist in democratic
societies?_ The existence question would seem to be one of a more
general class of questions that includes "why are there business
firms?", "why are there public bureaucracies?", "why are there
armies?" one general answer is that all these organizations help
solve collective dilemmas: they overcome bad incentives (such as
those in the Prisoner's Dilemma) and strategic uncertainty (as in
the Battle of the Sexes).1 Firms can thus produce more widgets
than can freely contracting agents transacting in the market;
armies can produce more force_than the sum of their parts: and so
forth. Why not a similar story for political parties, one
1. The standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes
stories each involve two players, each choosing between two
possible actions. The prisoner's dilemma story goes something
like the following. The two players are suspects in a burglary
being interrogated separately. The interrogators offer each
suspect the following deal: turn state’s witness against your
partner, and you will go free. If neither confesses, both will be
convicted of a lesser charge of trespassing. If both confess,
however, both will be convicted of the more serious, original
charge. Thus, the dilemma: both players hope the other does not .
confess, but both have incentives to confess rather than keep
quiet. Thus, by acting in their own "best" interests, both will
confess and be punished for burglary. -Battle of the Sexes, on
the other hand, poses a coordination problem for a man and a
woman trying to decide how to spend an evening together. The man
most prefers to go to a ball game, while the woman wants to go to
the opera. But neither wants to go alone to his or her preferred
option. In both cases, the players would like to have a means of
coordinating their individual choices to get a better outcome: a
mafia boss promising to kill both burglars if either confesses,
or a priest who makes the couple alternate between his preferred
activities and hers or be damned to hell for all eternity, for
example.
whereby they produce more "public policy benefits" than could
their members acting atomistically?
_
The primary problem with applying this logic to political
parties is that the public policy benefits that parties deliver
are ultimately allocated by the democratic procedures of the
state. The.generic procedures that legislatures use to make
decisions, however, do not lead to consistent policy choices.
They are "unstable", in the parlance of social choice theory, as
a series of "instability theorems" have demonstrated.2 These
theorems make the persistence of parties seem problematic. They
seem to predict ever-shifting majority coalitions, with each new
majority coalition implementing a different policy.
The best-known rejoinder to the instability theorems insofar
as they apply to majority rule institutions, such as
legislatures, is embodied in the notion ofla structure—induced
equilibrium, first introduced in studies of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987). ‘The
basic idea is that House decisions are rarely made by a process
that looks like pure majority-rule on the floor. Instead, there
are structures and procedures that constrain both the range of
2. The spatial modelling literature has demonstrated that in aseries of pairwise votes, any policy that garners majority
support in a test against the status quo policy can itself bedefeated in a subsequent pairing with at least one other policy,
and so on. Thus, there is no global "winner" among the range ofpossible policy choices, and hence no preference-induced policystability (McKelvey 1976: Schofield 1984). In fact, thisinstability result applies not just to majority rule but to all
non-collegial decision rules (Schofield 1980; Cox 1984: Schwartz1982). We shall speak in the text only of majority rule,however.
feasible alternatives, and the order in which policy options are
paired with each other. one such institutional structure is an
array of committees endowed with the ability to veto legislation
in their respective jurisdictions. Another is the right of a
central authority, the Speaker, to set the agenda. These
structural departures from majority rule, it is argued, stabilize
policy choice.
The most important criticism of the structure-induced
equilibrium approach, due to Riker (1980), is that institutions
are not exogenous. They are endogenous —- i.e., a matter of
social choice. In Riker’s view, if different "structures" lead
to different policy choices, then people will anticipate this;
choice over structures will inherit the instability of choice
over policies. Riker's critique has pushed the question in the
literature back one step. Are equilibrium-inducing institutions
themselves subject to majority-rule instability?
one might opine that the rules by which structures are
chosen and modified are non—majoritarian, so that majoritynrule
instability in the choice of structures is empirically
irrelevant. ‘The U.S. House of Representatives’ standing rules,
for example, stipulate that the standing rules of the House can
be changed (once adopted by majority rule) only by unanimous
consent, by more than 2/3 of its members voting to suspend the
rules (and then a majority voting to amend the standing rules),
or pursuant to a report from the Rules Committee. This is not
majority rule, and serves to entrench the standing rules, and
policy deals based on those rules.3
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But can the House commit itself to obeying its own rules
regulating how its rules are to change? Implicit in Riker's
argument is the claim that they cannot. It goes something like
the following. The constitution gives Congress full power to
make its own rules. If a majority wished to change the rules
entrenching the rules, they could (by majority rule) override any
points of order and proceed to do just that.
How can one escape this trap? There appear to us to be
three main routes, not necessarily mutually exclusive or
exhaustive.4 First, Shepsle (1986) notes that Riker's argument
_ assumes a one—tc—one and certain mapping of rules into policy.
If this mapping is not one—to-one, or not certain, then
preferences over rules might not inherit the instability of
preferences over policy. Perhaps rules, if entrenched, merely
set up a repeated game. We know there will be multiple
I
equilibria in such games, with widely differing equilibrium
3. The rules entrenching the standing rules actually induce onlya bit more stability: 2/3-majority rule is stable in twodimensions, but not in higher-dimensional spaces. ‘See Greenberg(1979) , Schofield (1986).
4. A fourth route, which we do not take up in the text, arguesthe substantive point: that, in fact, House rules are notultimately subject to lex partis majoris.
policy outcomes possible.5 Thus, before any particular set of
rules has been chosen, there might be strategic uncertainty
regarding which equilibrium will be chosen. The status quo
rules, however, already have been chosen, and the equilibrium
selection stage has already been passed. Thus, the uncertainty
attached to the status quo rules is substantially less than the
uncertainty attached to alternative, as—yet—untried rules. To
the extent that legislators are risk-averse, then, the status quo
rules will be favored.
A second way around Riker’s dilemma might arise from
transactions costs. If creating a winning coalition is costly,
than already-formed coalitions will be stabilized because
potential defectors must pay a cost to assemble a new winning
coalition
——
so the policy benefits gained by defection must
exceed the coalition-formation costs in order to be worth the
effort.
We already know, from the work of Sloss (1973), that adding
transactions costs to the basic spatial model can in principle
produce structurally stable cores. For example, if the
configuration of ideal points is "close" to the one of the
razor’s edge cases necessary for a preference-induced
5. This follows from the "Folk Theorem," which states,basically, that any strategy combination in a repeated game thatprovides better payoffs to players than would arise from
repeatedly playing the equilibrium strategy for the single-shotgame, is sustainable as an equilibrium. See, e.g. Rasmusen. In
other words, basically any observable outcome can reflect
"equilibrium" behavior in an infinitely repeated game. This
result suggests that the real strategic problem facing players in
repeated games, such as the prisoner's dilemma, is how to get
coordination on "better" equilibrium strategy combinations.
equilibrium, then even "small" transactions costs will be
sufficient to preserve the status quo, because the small policy
benefits that could be attained by overturning the status quo are-
not worth the costs of legislating (opportunity costs,
negotiating costs, collective action costs).6
If one focuses on the negotiating and collective action
costs of legislating, the point might be put this way: there is
always a collective action problem which must be solved before
the instability inherent in the structure of preferences can be
manifested. If that collective action problem can be made more
difficult by those preferring the status quo, then the costs of
legislating may be particularly high
-- although this observation
leads away from what.are usually thought of as transactions
costs.
In this paper, we focus on a third way in which institutions
might be stabilized: one in which stability is enforced by
extra—legislative organization and bond-posting. If a subset of
legislators were all "bonded" by membership in a valuable and
extra-legislative group, such as a political party, and if the
cost of giving up the bond were expected to exceed most
realistically imaginable benefits from defection, then
6. While the stabilizing properties of transactions costs arewidely admitted, noone is very satisfied with transactions costsas a general reason for stability. A frequent complaint is thatthey can "explain anything": if one observes stability, claimthe transactions costs were high: if one observes change, thecosts must have been low. Without an independent measure oftransactions costs case by case, how would one know? Anothercomplaint is that transactions costs enter (in many models, notjust Sloss’) as an exogenously posited, rather than endogenouslyderived, cost.
legis1ators"choices over structure (and hence policy) might
therewith be-stabilized.
our thesis is that the rules of the Democratic Caucus in the
House of Representatives dictate that all members of the Caucus‘
are bound, if they wish to retain their membership, to support
Caucus decisions in the House on a variety of key structural
matters e- such as the election of the Speaker and the design and
staffing of the committee system.- To the extent that membership
in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it constitutes a
bond, the posting of which stabilizes key features of the
structure of the House, and hence key features of the policy
‘decisions made in the House. This notion, and its implications
for congressional structure and policy, are the primary topic of
this essay.
2. The Party Bond
There are two types of assets that Mes place in bond mith
their party colleagues: electoral benefits (i.e., things that
directly help members win reelection) and intra-legislative
benefits (i.e., things that increase the value of the seat). We
consider each type of asset.
It is best to start with the intra—1egislative assets since
these are clearer and are presupposed in the discussion of
electoral assets. The "intra-legislative asset" bond that a
member posts consists of all party-specific investments that the
member makes. one example is the investment of time on a
committee that a member makes. Such an investment endows the
member with human capital
—- contacts, knowledge, lists of
contributors -— whose value would decline were the member
transferred to another committee. It also endows the member with
seniority on the committee. Were a member expelled from the
Democratic caucus, she would automatically lose her Democratic
committee assignments, hence all accrued Democratic seniority, on
all committees. Neither committee-specific human captial nor
committee—specific seniority is readily transferable to other
uses should the member be expelled from the party, hence from
party—contingent committee assignments.
Whether or not an expelled member suffers a net seniority
loss or is unable to use all her committee—specific human capitaldepends, of course, on events subsequent to her expulsion. ‘If
the member becomes an independent, prospects for good committee
assignments are rather poor, and the gross loss suffered upon
forfeiture of the "seniority bond" and of the "committee-specific
human capital bond" will probably turn into a net loss as well.
If the member can gain admittance to the other party's caucus,
she may be able to secure positions on her old committees with
seniority in the new party comparable to that in the old. In
this case, her seniority and human capital bonds have still been
forfeited but the other party has offered a compensating "signing
bonus". Even with a signing bonus, however, a departing member
of the majority party will probably be worse off, unless his or
her new party attains a majority.
Another bond that each member posts within his party is the
sum total of "uncollected party-contingent IOUs". If as a junior
member Ihave worked harder than my current "wages" alone would
justify, then perhaps as a senior member Iwill exercise
disproportionate influence (of. Becker and Stigler 19?4). In the
meantime, the prospect of a payoff that is contingent on
continued good standing in the Democratic Caucus keeps me within
the pale of the party. Alternatively, if Ihave cut a deal
within the majority party that delivers a stream of benefits over
several years, then fear of forfeiting this stream of benefits
keeps me in line.
Another kind of intralegislative bond, one that pertains
only to the majority party, is the sum total of all advantages of
majority status. For example, on most committees majority-party_
staff outnumber minority—party staff by at least 2'to 1and
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sometimes by as much as 4 to 1. Expulsion from the majority
party carries with it loss of a variety of such perquisites. The
minority party, even if it accepts a majority-party expellee as a
member, cannot credibly offer to recreate these perquisites.
As regards electoral assets, the bond that a member posts is
the expected electoral loss that she would suffer upon expulsion
from the party caucus._ Why.would a member anticipate electoral
losses upon expulsion? There are at least two reasons.
First, being expelled from the party caucus reduces the
probability that the member will secure his party's nomination at
the next election. The local party hierarchy may have ties to
the national organization which influence their support for the
expelled member. Contributors may find the legislator a poorer
investment, if she has been stripped of her assignments with her
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original party and failed to find fully comparable ones as an
independent or with the other party. Potential intraparty
challengers may seize upon expulsion as a primary election
campaign issue.7
Second, if the member does lose the party label, her
reelection prospects may be considerably lessened. Certainly
this is true if she fails to secure the nomination of the other
major party: the number of members who win seats in Congress as
independents has declined to virtually zero (Schlesinger 1985)."
But even if the member is in a position to switch between the
major parties (and few are), the process is not a simple or
riskless one. Ex ante, reelection under a new label has many
more imponderables_than reelection under the old label. Thus,
the distribution of party orientation in the member's electoral
district, or the expected difficulty of running under a new
label, acts as an extra-legislative barrier to exit for potential
defectors. It is a cost that any new majority cannot credibly
promise to legislate away. We think this external stabilization
due to the inertial behavior of voters and the associated value
of the party label is an_important reason why modern political
parties (post-universal suffrage) have been more stable than the
shifting factions of pre-modern polities.
7. This line of influence is much clearer and stronger in aparliamentary system such as the U.K., of course. Expulsion froma British party’s caucus leads with virtual certainty todeselection, and the prospects of joining the other party are notgood. Nonetheless, several scholars have argued that members ofCongress are extremely risk averse, so it might be inferred thatthe same line of influence exists in the U.S. (Mann 1978;Jacobson 1987).
ll
3. Posting the Bond
In parliamentary systems, a government's threat to resign if
defeated on a vote of confidence (resignation often being
followed by a dissolution of the legislature and new elections)
is a powerful force for the stability of government-brokered
logrolls. The sequence of events in parliament is such that the
government can, in essence, publically commit to resignation
before the vote. Would—be dissidents are thus forced to consider
the merits of the government as a whole, rather than the merits
of the paritcular issue(s) at stake. The consequence of voting
against the government, after it has been declared a matter of‘
confidence, is not merely that an obnoxious bill or motion is
defeated, but also that the government resigns and perhaps
dissolves parliament: thus, the entire policy logroll that the
government has pushed is at risk of unrave1ing.8
Majority parties in the U.S. Congress cannot compete with
parliamentary parties in the strength of incentives they can
marshall, but the logic of their design is in key respects the
same. The key logrolls of a U}S. majority party are often
protected by the judicious allocation of committee power (e.g.,
the dominance of organized labor on the Education and Labor
8. In July 1993, Britain’s Conservative Prime Minister, JohnMajor, was abandoned by a group of his own backbenchers andthereby defeated on the floor in his attempt to get the House ofCommons to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (the treaty for Europeanunion) in its then—current form. Major called the defectors’bluff, making the vote a matter of confidence, and this time thedefectors returned to the fold, and the measure was passed.
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Committee; the required supportof the oil—depletion allowance for
a Democratic assignment to Ways and Means; the dominance of the
Interior Committee by Westerners; and the dominance of the
Acgriculture Committee by Members from agricultural districts).
would-be dissidents are thus often faced with structural
impediments (as, for example, the Democratic Study Group was
faced with Judge Smith’s obstructionism from his perch atop the
Rules Committee).
What is the consequence of smashing or ignoring those
impediments? It is not merely that policy is changed on one
issue in the desired direction. Instead, the entire policy
equilibrium that the erstwhile structure supported is brought
_into question. The caucus rules recognize these wide policy
ramifications by stipulating the utlimate sanction-—expulsion—-
for members who fail to go along with caucus recommendations
regarding key elements of House structure. At least, this is our
interpretation of the Democratic Caucus’ rules.
It may help to make the point if we excerpt the relevant
caucus rules in stylized form:
Caucus Rule I: Caucus members are obliged to vote with
the majority of the caucus on specified House votes,
including (a) the election of the speaker and the
allocation of committee positions among majority party
members: (b) the adoption of key House rules; and (c)
appeals of the Speaker’s interpretations of House rules,
insofar as they affect either (a) or (b). Key house
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rules are (i) those designating the powers of the
various positions in (a), such as the Speaker's agenda-
setting powers, the agenda-setting powers of committee
and subcommittee chairpersons, and the jurisdictions of
the committees; and (ii) those specifying how House
rules can be changed in the House (e.g., pursuant to a
report from the majority—party dominated Rules
Committee).
Th The actual rules of the Democratic caucus are fairly close to
stylized rule I. A long—standing rule of the Democratic Caucus
(found, for example, in rule 7 in the 95th Caucus and in rule 3B
pin the 101st) states: "With respect to voting in the House for
Speaker and other officers of the House, for each committee
chairman, and for membership of committees, a majority vote of
those present and voting at a Democratic Caucus shall bind all
Members of the Caucus." This rule tallies pretty closely to our
Rule I(a).
There is no equally explicit commitment to the "key"
standing_Ru1es of the House specified in our Rule I(b). But the
vote on adoption of the House rules is taken immediately after
election of a Speaker and before committee assignments are handed
14
out:9 at least on initial adoption there seem to be ample
incentives for majority party members to support the rules
proposed by their party, and empirically the majority party
almost always does stick together on the bulk of the Standing
Rules. We interpret the House Standing Rules to be part of the
structure that Caucus members commit themselves to support byjoining the caucus.
Similarly, there is no explicit declaration that caucus
members choosing to override their own speaker's interpretation
of, say, committee jurisdictions or powers would have done
anything contrary to caucus rules- We believe, nonetheless, that
9. In at least one instance, the House did not follow its choiceof presiding officer with an explicit adoption of rules. Thiswas during the 51st House (1389-1891), during which the notorious"Reed Rules" were first codified. Without an explicit set of
is known as "ordinary parliamentary procedure." Such is alwaysthe case prior to the election of a Speaker. By tradition, the
a speaker. "ordinary" parliamentary procedure is quite difficultto pin down, since, of course, members have not explicitly agreedto just what is "ordinary" and what is not. The Speaker of the51st House, Rep. Thomas B. Reed (R-Maine) interpreted ordinaryparliamentary procedure to mean two things: first, that the
to be pursuing dilatory tactics; and second, that partis majorisis absolute, i.e., that the majority is_sovereign and can doanything it pleases, regardless of any precedent followed byprior Houses. Employing these two principles of ordinaryparliamentary practice, Reed inaugurated the modern era ofspecial rules to govern the consideration of important bills,through simple majority adoption of Rules Committee reports.Through this device, and through Reed’s assumption of theauthority to limit floor recognition to members deemed to havenon-dilatory intentions, the majority Republican party caucusmade it clear that it is the majority caucus that rules in theHouse.
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such.support is indeed.expected of caucus members in good
standing.10
Caucus Rule II: Failure to vote with the caucus
majority on votes specified in Rule Ileads to
automatic expulsion from the caucus.
Until recently, Democratic Caucus rules specified that "any
member of the Democratic Caucus of the House of Representatives
failing to abide by the rules governing the same shall thereby
automatically cease to be a member of the Caucus." This is
essentially our Rule II. In recent Congresses, the expulsion
clause has been changed; members can be expelled only by a 2/3
vote in Caucus (Caucus Rule 1, 101st Congress).
10. one recent example of the importance of binding Caucus votes
concerns the demise of the once-powerful Joint Committee onAtomic Energy. Congress established the JCAE in 1946 as a joint
House and Senate committee charged with overseeing the
development and promotion of nuclear power. Prior to 1969 and
the passage of the New Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), thepolicy-making_apparatus in the U.S. was biased in favor ofpromoting nuclear power. Environmentalists and prospective
neighbors had few grounds on which to challenge proposed new
plants; pro—nuke members of Congress populated the JCAE.
However, opposition to nuclear power at the federal level becamefirmly entrenched in the regulatory process via NEPA and the 1971Calvert Cliffs decision. Nuclear power advocates lost theirprivileged institutional position for good when, at the opening
of the 95th Congress, a coalition of anti-proliferation and
environmentalist Democrats was able to include the demise of the
JCAE in the rules of the House, passed by a straight party vote.Since the dissolution of the JCAE, attempts to streamline the
regulatory process have failed to generate any steam.
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Does this change matter?11 We think the game that the
Caucus rules set up is not one in which stability is created as
_in standard structure—induced equilibrium arguments. Rather, the
Caucus as a corporate indefinitely-lived entity attempts to
prevent cheating by establishing a reputation for toughness in
punishment decisions generally {of which the decision to expel is
the most severe). With such a reputation, potential defectors
are deterred, and the future stream of benefits of successful
log-rolling accrued to all in the party. Without such a
reputation, the lines in the sand drawn by the Caucus rules are
worthless, and the Caucus has little value in stabilizing House
structures, hence little value in achieving structure-induced
eguilibria.12 Thus, it does'not really matter whether the Caucus
rules specify automatic expulsion or expulsion upon 2/3 vote.
What matters is its reputation for toughness, since it is
continually playing something like Chicken with its own factions.
11. An "automatic expulsion" grants tremendous power to theparty leader, as the punishment is meted out "automatically" bythe leadership and is not necessarily subject to an approval voteby the caucus itself. A member of the Caucus could, of course,through conventional parliamentary procedures, challenge theexpulsion decision by the leadership. If the challenge gainsmajority support, then the expulsion is rescinded. Requiring atwo—thirds vote reduces this delegation of authority to theleadership. Whether or not this makes expulsion more or lesslikely is another question.
12. The situation is similar to entry deterrence by a monopolistin an infinitely-repeated game. And, like a monpolist, theCaucus may have to incur short—term losses
-- such as thetemporary loss of its majority status ~— in order to establishits reputation for toughness.
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Caucus Rule III: Caucus Rules (in particular, Rules I,
IIand III) can be changed only by a) majority vote in
the Caucus upon recommendation from a committee
appointed by the party leadership, or b) extraordinary
procedure.
This is a rough paraphrase of the actual caucus rules.
Under normal parliamentary procedure (adopted in the 101st
Congress, for example, in Caucus Rule 8), the rules can be
changed only by two-thirds vote or by a majority after advance
notification. Caucus rules 45 and 46 then amend parliamentary
rules, giving the Caucus chair and Committee on organization,
Study and Review authority to propose amendments to the rules,
which are then subject to approval by normal majority rule; in
the 101st Congress, for example, previous notice is defined in
Caucus Rule 45-B, which stipulates that a member proposing to
amend the Caucus Rules must provide twenty copies of the proposed
change.
Having reviewed the caucus rules, we can restate our point.
By joining the majority party caucus, each member publicly‘
promises to support key features of House organization and rules.
If these caucus rules were enforced exogenously, then House
structure would be stabilized to some degree: "constitutional"
change of the House rules could be effected only by a group
comprising a majority of the caucus and a majority of the House.
This would mean that structural1y—induced policy eguilibria in
one- or two-dimensional spaces would not be subject to the
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"inherited" instability feared by Riker, although the same
problem would loom for higher—dimensional spaces (Cox and
Mcxelvey 1984; Tsebelis 1993}. The majority party would be
directly stabilized as a procedural coalition and indirectly
stabilized as a policy coalition.
Of course, the majority party's caucus rules are not
exogenously enforced. If they are obeyed it must be because it
is in the interests of legislators to obey them. Thus, even if
the real caucus rules are reasonable facsimiles of our stylized
ones, there still remains the question of enforcement. In
particular, why is the majority caucus’ threat of expulsion ever
credible when it involves a pivotal defection?
4. ARE THE RULES CREDIBLE? DOES THE CAUCUS BLINK?
Let us suppose that membership in the Democratic Caucus of the
U.S. House really is valuable and that caucus rules specify that
any member violating the structure of the House as set up by the
majority party will be expelled. Will anyone believe that the
rules will be enforced in the event of a pivotal defection? If
not, than pivotal defections,l3 which are the only ones that
really matter, will not be deterred——and caucus rules will do
little to entrench the House's structure.
13. By "pivotal," we mean any group whose defection would stripthe party of its majority.
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To pose the question a bit more precisely, suppose that a
.pivotal minority in the majority party wants to move policy on a
particular dimension to some new point but are prevented from
doing so by an ex ante veto exercised by the members of some
committee (in cahoots, let us say, with the majority party
leadership, so that it is not simply a matter of discharging the
committee). If the pivotal group makes common cause with the
Republicans to circumvent whatever bits of structure need
circumventing, and then change the policy as they desire, the
loyal members of the majority caucus are presented with a fait
accompli. They can either expel the dissidents, thereby losing
their majority, or gulp loudly, forgive.and forget. Why do not
the dissidents feel confident that the caucus will choose the
latter path?
An analogous question arises in parliamentary systems. Why
do not pivotal dissidents call the Prime Minister's bluff, voting
against the government on a matter of confidence? After all,
they may calculate that after the vote the government will decide
that continuing in office is better than carrying out a painful
threat. Indeed, there are those in the literature who argue
against the importance of threats of resignation and dissolution
on the grounds that both are more painful for the frontbenchers
issuing the threat than for the backbenchers receiving it.
One answer in both cases hinges on reputation. The
-government in a parliamentary system, if it publicly commits t0
resignation upon defeat, pays a substantial penalty if it then
changes its mind afterwards (even in systems where such changes
20
of mind are not illegal). Similarly, the Democratic Caucus has
made a very public commitment to expel (or discipline) members
who fail to support the key features of House structure which
undergird the party's logrolling abilities. If it backs down
easily, its credibility evaporates and its utility as an
organization diminishes substantially. In particular, the value
of holding office as a leader of the organization would diminish-
-suggesting that it is the current leadership, with an eye to the
future value of their posts, who push for enforcement of caucus
rules.
But one might reasonably ask-how a reputation for toughness
can be established against pivotal groups. In twentieth-century
U.s. Congressional history, there are no instances of pivotal
groups being expelled, or even of pivotal groups leaving their
party——as, say, the Hata-Ozawa group left the Japanese Liberal
Democrats. So how can a reputation for toughness be established?
We think the answer has to do with the full range of punishments
that the party leadership can hand out. If non—pivotal groups
are punished, possibly with sanctions less severe than expulsion,
then members of a prospective dissident group will be concerned
with the group’s unity of purpose and pivotalness. Will some of
them be punished? Will they present a united front against
punishment of any of their number? can a subset of them be
bribed to stay with the party, leaving the others non—pivota1 and
vulnerable to punishment?
There are also the kinds of question that arise in any kind
of rebellion. Is it safe for a member to communicate his desire
21
to overthrow the House structure to another member of his party?
The obvious strategy for the party leadership, upon hearing of
such communication, is to punish the would—be rebellion
organizer. This suggests that only rebellions based on fairly
homogeneous pre—existing groups -— e.g., midwestern Progressive
Republicans can get off the ground.
Another consideration that may enhance the credibility of
the caucus as a protector of the procedural status quo has to do
with the value of the party label in elections. Suppose a
pivotal group within the majority party runs roughshod over those
aspects of the House rules that the caucus rules attempt to
entrench. Suppose the caucus rules "automatically" expel the
group but the caucus meets to consider whether the rules really
apply (or, alternatively, whether to reinstate the expelled
members without prejudice). In such a case, the loyalist members
of the caucus (assume either that they meet without the
dissidents or constitute a sufficient majority of the caucus to
do whatever they want} may fear the electoral consequences of
reinstatement. For example, they may feel that reinstatement
would constitute acquiescence to the policy change against which
the loyalists voted. To the extent that the policy is
electorally salient, this would lower the probability of
reelection of all loyalists, for the same reason that voting for
the policy change would have. Thus, if caucus members are purely
office—motivated, the loyalists will in fact have a credible
threat: it will be in their own immediate electoral interests to
vote against reinstatement (or to vote for expulsion). If caucus
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members also value policy intrinsically, and value internal
offices within the House and party, as we assume they do, the
situation is much more complicated. But at least we can say that
the reelection component of each loyalist member's motivation
argues for expulsion.
Finally, it may be that the caucus rules are efficacious not
so much because they are credibly enforced but rather because
they serve an informational role. The causus rules draw a "line
in the sand," that clearly defines which types of behavior are in
and out of bounds. How this might work is suggested by some
recent work by Diermeier (1993).
.Simp1ifying greatly, Diermeier
argues that a committee system is stabilized not because the
House can credibly commit to give certain committees special
privileges (e.g., closed rules on the floor) but because
committee incentives to specialize
-— which specialization is
assumed to reduce uncertainty for all legislators
-- would be
destroyed were the floor ever not to defer to the committee's
recommendations.14 Anticipating this destruction of incentives
to specialize, and valuing the reduction in uncertainty brought
by specialization (all legislators are assumed risk averse), the
floor honors its committees’ recommendations (see also Shepsle
and Weingast 1979). This argument applies generally to any
committee system--one set up by parties, as in Legislative
14. The committee, in other words, plays a trigger strategyagainst the floor: it provides the benefits of specialization toall, as long as the floor allows it policy rents (by deferring toits recommendations); but it refuses to specialize forevermore ifthe floor violates its expectations once.
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Leviathan, or one set up by non—partisan self—selection, as in
other parts of the literature. To the extent that it is
convincing, it suggests that the committee system-cum-Speaker
that the majority party sets up will be stable.
In Congress, committees frequently have their handiwork
amended, or even undone, on the floor. How can one tell which
amendments are minor and which ought to trigger a specialization
strike by members of the_offended committee? one answer is that
the caucus pays its committees not directly in policy rents but
instead in structural prerogatives. If all agents play within
the rules of the game, then specialization continues apace, even
if a committee occasionally miscalculates floor preferences and
gets rolled. But if "revolutionary" or "unconstitutional" action
is taken, then incentives to specialize are eroded because
structural advantages-—which can be parlayed into policy rents-—
are no longer credible.
5. Conclusion
The social choice literature shows that, under fairly broad
circumstances, policy choices made under the method of majority
decision are unstable. This means that, for any chosen policy,
there exists at least one alternative that can command a majority
when placed against the original policy in a pairwise vote.
Shepsle (1979) and Shepsle and Weingast (1987) respond to this
finding by showing that procedural rules and structures, by
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putting agenda control into the hands of specific members, can
induce stable majority choices over policy alternatives.
Shepsle and Weingast (1987) and Weingast and Marshall (1988)
have further argued that House members have created a
decentralized agenda-control system in which committees with
discrete jurisdictions make sophisticated policy offers to the
whole House on policies in their respective jurisdictions. House
committees are alleged to have both gate-keeping authority (they
decide whether an alternative to the reversionary policy will be
offered at all) and an ex post veto over changes to their
proposals (thus insuring committee members that they cannot be
made worse off than the reversionary policy_by having made an
initial proposal). House committees, the argument goes, then
engage in a "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" cooperative
logroll to pass legislation that makes members of each committee
better off than if they did not propose new policies.
In Legislative Leviathan, we argued that the majority party
caucus adds another layer of structure and process onto the
committee structure studied by Shepsle-Weingast and Weingast—
Marshall. The majority party in the House achieves stable policy
outcomes by binding its members to support a specific structure
of agenda power
-- represented by the Speaker, the committee
chairpersons, and the Rules Committee
—- a structure which then
leads to committees choosing policies that, on average, benefit
majority party members more than minority party members. We
emphasized the role of the Speaker in controlling access to floor
time for the outputs of the various committees (the Speaker's
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veto over scheduling). We largely agreed that much agenda
control is decentralized, as in the models of Shepsle—Weingast
and Weingast-Marshall, but argued that the exercise of such
decentralized agenda control was itself subject to regulatory
efforts by the party leadership and ultimately to restructuring
by the majority party's caucus.
If House rules were established exogeneously, then they
would induce stable policy choices. The importance of
"structure" would be transparent
-- and the influence of party
members on outcomes would be obvious.
However, the rules are not determined exogenously. The
Constitution merely requires the House to choose a presiding
officer, stipulates that a majority of the membership constitutes
a quorum for doing business, and provides that "each house shall
determine the rules of its proceedings“ (Article I, Section 5:2).
In other words, the members make their own rules. Thus, as Riker
has cautioned, referring to the policy consequences of structure
merely pushes the instability problems of majorityvrule voting
back one step, from voting over policy options to voting over the
rules which establish agenda power and.hence condition policy
outcomes. So how can one argue that structures induce
equilibrium (more specifically, that House rules do?)
We argue that House rules are entrenched by majority party
caucus rules. If the Democratic Caucus rules were to specify
exactly what we stylized them as saying in Rules I, IIand III,
and were exogenously enforced, then the argument for stability
would be almost a standard structure-induced equilibrium
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argument. The only new wrinkles would be the appeal to caucus
rules as the stabilizing element in the story and the observation
that only a kind of "bicameral" stability would be induced,
similar to that discussed in cox and McKe1vey (1984), Hammond and
Miller (1937), and Tsebelis (1993).
We think in fact the game is more complicated and more
reliant on transactions costs to induce stability. That Caucus
members by their membership commit to support key features of
House structure is fairly clear from an examination of the caucus
rules. Pivotal minorities who seek to defect from the procedural
equilibrium to which the party agrees before the Congress starts,
presumably because they dislike the policy equilibrium thereby
.induced, are to some extent deterred by a threat that they will
be expelled (or that the party will splinter). The threat is not
entirely incredible because the Caucus as a corporate actor has
much to lose
—- its value as a forum within which long-term
policy deals can be consummated
-- should it give in to cheating
by pivotal factions on structural issues: and because individual
legislators within the Caucus also have much to lose--the policy
at stake, other policies that would be susceptible to change were
a precedent for circumventing structure established, and some
portion of their electorally valuable reputation for fighting for
certain policies.
The caucus rules may also be useful in clarifying the "rules
of reciprocity". It has often been claimed that legislators
trade votes on policy and support for structure. It is hard to
trade long-term support for specific policies, because there is
2'?
always the question of what amendment constitutes a big change in
support, and what is small enough to be allowed. In contrast, if
factions trade procedural support, the ultimate legislative
consequences are less clear, but what constitutes a violation of
the trade is made quite clear. Thus, formal models of
reciprocity, such as Diermeier's, should perhaps focus on
structure rather than policy.
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